*Harrison* v. *Greyvan Lines,* 331 United States 704; *Bartels* v. *Birmingham,* 332 United States 126). In general an employee, as distinguished from a person who is engaged in a business of his own, is one who ''follows the usual path of an employee'' and is dependent on the business which he serves. As an aid in assessing the total situation the Court mentioned some of the characteristics of the two classifications which should be considered. Among these are: The extent to which the services rendered are an integral part of the principal's business, the permanency of the relationship, the opportunities for profit or loss, the initiative judgment or foresight exercised by the one who performs the services, the amount of investment, and the degree of control which the principal has in the situation. The Court specifically rejected the degree of control retained by the principal as the sole criterion to be applied.

(b) At least in one situation it is possible to be specific: (1) Where the sawmill or concentration yard to which the products are delivered owns the land or the appropriation rights to the timber or other forestry products; (2) the crew boss has no very substantial investment in tools or machinery used; and (3) the crew does not transfer its relationship as a unit from one sawmill or concentration yard to another, the crew boss and the employees working under him will be considered employees of the sawmill or concentration yard. Other situations, where one or more of these three factors is not present, will be considered as they arise on the basis of the criteria mentioned in paragraph (a) of this section. Where all of these three criteria are present, however, it will make no difference if the crew boss receives the entire compensation for the production from the sawmill or concentration yard and distributes it in any way he chooses to the crew members. Similarly, it will make no difference if the hiring, firing, and supervising of the crew members is left in the hands of the crew boss. (See *Tobin* v. *LaDuke,* 190 F. 2d 977 (C.A. 9); *Tobin* v. *Anthony-Williams Mfg. Co.,* 196 F. 2d 547 (C.A. 8).)

### § 788.17 Employees employed in both exempt and nonexempt work.

The exemption for an employee employed in exempt work will be defeated in any workweek in which he performs a substantial amount of nonexempt work. For enforcement purposes nonexempt work will be considered substantial in amount if more than 20 percent of the time worked by the employee in a given workweek is devoted to such work. Where two types of work cannot be segregated, however, so as to permit separate measurement of the time spent in each, the employee will not be exempt.

## PART 789—GENERAL STATEMENT ON THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 12(a) AND SECTION 15(a)(1) OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938, RELATING TO WRITTEN ASSURANCES

Sec.



AUTHORITY: 52 Stat. 1060, as amended; 29 U.S.C. 201–219.

SOURCE: 15 FR 5047, Aug. 5, 1950, unless otherwise noted.

### § 789.0 Introductory statement.

(a) Section 12(a) and section 15(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938[1] (hereinafter referred to as the

[1] Pub. L. 718, 75th Cong., 3d sess. (52 Stat. 1060), as amended by the Act of June 26, 1940 (Pub. Res. No. 88, 76th Cong., 3d sess., 54 Stat. 616); by Reorganization Plan No. 2 (60 Stat. 616); by Reorganization Plan No. 2 (60 Stat. 1095), effective July 16, 1946; by the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, approved May 14, 1947 (61 Stat. 84); by the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, approved October 26, 1949 (Pub. L. 393, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 63 Stat. 910); by Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1950 (15 FR 3174), effective May 24, 1950; and by the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of

(Act) contain certain prohibitions against putting into interstate or foreign commerce any goods ineligible for shipment (commonly called ''hot goods''), in the production of which the child-labor or wage-hour standards of the Act were not observed. These sections were amended by the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949[2] to provide, among other things, protection against these ''hot goods'' prohibitions with respect to purchasers ''who acquired such goods for value without notice of such violation'' if they did so ''in good faith in reliance on'' a specified ''written assurance.''

(b) These amendments to the Act relating to purchasers in good faith and written assurances are for the protection of purchasers. The Act does not provide that a purchaser must secure such an assurance or that a supplier must give it. The amendments confer no express authority for the Department of Labor to require the use of these assurances or to prescribe their form or content. Whether any particular written assurance affords the statutory protection to a purchaser who acquires his goods in good faith and for value without notice of an applicable violation, is left for determination by the courts. Opinions issued by the Department of Labor on this question are advisory only and represent simply the Department's best judgment as to what the courts may hold.

(c) The interpretations contained in this general statement are confined to the statutory protection accorded these purchasers in section 12(a) and section 15(a)(1) of the Act. These interpretations, with respect to this protection of purchasers, indicate the construction of the law which the Secretary of Labor and the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division[3] believe to be correct and which will guide them in the performance of their administrative duties under the Act unless and until they are otherwise directed by authoritative decisions of the courts or conclude, upon re-examination of an interpretation, that it is incorrect.

[15 FR 5047, Aug. 5, 1950, as amended at 21 FR 1450, Mar. 6, 1956]

### § 789.1 Statutory provisions and legislative history.

Section 12(a) of the Act provides, in part that no producer, manufacturer or dealer shall ship or deliver for shipment in commerce any goods produced in an establishment situated in the United States in or about which within 30 days prior to the removal of such goods therefrom, any oppressive child labor has been employed. Section 12(a) then provides an exception from this prohibition in the following language:

> *Provided,* That any such shipment or delivery for shipment of such goods by a purchaser who acquired them in good faith in reliance on written assurance from the producer, manufacturer, or dealer that the goods were produced in compliance with the requirements of this section, and who acquired such goods for value without notice of any such violation, shall not be deemed prohibited by this subsection * * *.

Section 15(a)(1) provides, in part, that it shall be unlawful for any person to transport, offer for transportation, ship, deliver, or sell with knowledge that shipment or delivery or sale thereof in commerce is intended, any goods in the production of which any employee was employed in violation of section 6 or 7 of the Act or any regulation or order of the Administrator issued under section 14. Section 15(a)(1) also provides the following exception with respect to this ''hot goods'' restriction:

> * * * any such transportation, offer, shipment, delivery, or sale of such goods by a purchaser who acquired them in good faith in reliance on written assurance from the producer that the goods were produced in compliance with the requirements of the Act, and who acquired such goods for value without notice of any such violation, shall not be deemed unlawful.

The most important portion of the legislative history of those provisions in sections 12(a) and 15(a)(1) which relate to the protection of purchasers is found in the following discussion of the

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1955, approved August 12, 1955 (Pub. L. 381, 84th Cong., 1st sess., C. 867, 69 Stat. 711).

[2] Pub. L. 393, 81st Cong., 1st sess. 963 Stat. 910.

[3] The functions of the Secretary and the Administrator under the Act are delineated in 13 FR 2195, 12 FR 6971, and 15 FR 3290.

amendment to section 15(a)(1), contained in the Statement of the Managers on the part of the House appended to the Conference Report on the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949: [4]

> This provision protects an innocent purchaser from an unwitting violation and also protects him from having goods which he has purchased in good faith ordered to be withheld from shipment in commerce by a ''hot goods'' injunction. An affirmative duty is imposed upon him to assure himself that *the goods in question were produced* in compliance with the Act, and he must have secured written assurance *to that effect* from the producer of the goods. The requirement that he must have made the purchase in good faith is comparable to similar requirements imposed on purchasers in other fields of law, and is to be subjected to the test of what a reasonable, prudent man, acting with due diligence, would have done in the circumstances. (Emphasis supplied.)

This discussion would appear to be generally applicable also to the similar provisions of the Act contained in section 12(a).

### § 789.2 " * * * in reliance on written assurance from the producer * * *."

In order for a purchaser to be protected under these provisions of the Act, he must acquire the goods ''in reliance on written assurance * * *.'' The written assurance specified in section 15(a)(1) is one from the ''producer'' and in section 12(a) it is one from the ''producer, manufacturer or dealer.''

Since the acquisition of the goods by the purchaser must be ''in reliance'' upon such written assurance it is obvious that the Act contemplates a written assurance given to the purchaser as a part of the transaction by which the goods are acquired and on which he can rely at the time of their acquisition. Thus, where the purchaser does not receive a written assurance at the time he acquires particular goods, he cannot be said to have acquired the goods ''in reliance on'' the specified written assurance merely because the producer later furnishes an assurance that all goods which the purchaser has previously acquired from him were produced in compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The assurances described in the Act are assurances in writing ''from'' the producer or ''from'' the producer, manufacturer, or dealer, as the case may be. It is therefore clear that the following procedures will not amount to ''written assurance from the producer'' within the meaning of the Act:

(a) The purchaser stamps his purchase order with the statement that the order is valid only for goods produced in compliance with the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. No written statement concerning the production of the goods is made to the purchaser by the producer. The producer ships the goods which the purchaser has ordered.

(b) The purchaser stamps the above statement on his purchase order and in addition notifies the producer that shipment of the goods so ordered will be construed by the purchaser as a guarantee by the producer that the goods were produced in compliance with the Act. The producer ships the goods to the purchaser.

In neither of these situations can the purchase order be deemed to contain a written assurance from the producer to the purchaser. A statement concerning the circumstances under which the order will be valid is sent to the producer, but no written instrument at all is given the purchaser by the producer. Although, in these situations, the shipment of the goods by the producer may establish a contractual relationship between the parties, the conditions of the statute are not satisfied because there is in neither situation any written assurance from the producer to the purchaser that the goods were produced in compliance with applicable provisions of the Act referred to in sections 12(a) and 15(a)(1).

### § 789.3 "* * * goods were produced in compliance with" * * * the requirements referred to.

It is apparent from the language of the statute and the statement appended to the Conference Report [5] that the written assurance referred to is one

[4] H. Rept. No. 1453, 81st Cong. 1st sess., p. 31.

[5] H. Rept. No. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st sess., p. 31.

with respect to specific goods in being, assuring the purchaser that the ''goods in question were produced in compliance'' with the requirements referred to in sections 12(a) and 15(a) (1). A written statement made prior to production of the particular goods is not the type of assurance contemplated by the statute.

A so-called ''general and continuing'' assurance or ''blanket guarantee'' stating, for instance, that all goods to be shipped to the purchaser during a twelve-month period following a certain date ''will be or were produced'' in compliance with applicable provisions of the Act would not afford the purchaser the statutory protection with respect to any production of such goods after the assurance is given. This type of assurance attempts to assure the purchaser concerning the future production of goods. With respect to any production of goods after the assurance is given, this ''general and continuing'' assurance would, at most, be an assurance that the goods will be produced in compliance with the Act.

The definitions of the terms ''goods'' and ''produced'' in sections 3(i) and 3(j) of the Act[6] respectively, should be considered in interpreting the requirement that the written assurance must relate to goods which were produced in compliance with applicable provisions of the Act. These definitions make it apparent, for instance that the raw materials from which a machine has been made retain their identity as ''goods'' even though these raw materials have been converted into an entirely different finished product in which the raw materials are merely a part.

Since ''goods,'' as defined in the Act, ''does not include goods after their delivery into the actual physical possession of the ultimate consumer thereof other than a producer, manufacturing, or processor thereof,'' the ''hot goods'' restrictions of section 12(a) and section 15(a)(1) do not apply to such ultimate consumers. There appears to be no need, therefore, for such consumers to secure these written assurances from their suppliers.

### § 789.4 Scope and content of assurances of compliance.

A question frequently asked is whether a single written assurance of compliance will suffice for purposes both of section 12(a), relating to child labor, and section 15(a)(1), relating to wage and hour standards. A single assurance would appear to be sufficient, provided it is specific enough to meet all the conditions of the two sections. Although it is possible that the courts might find assurances referring generally to compliance ''with the requirements of the Act'' adequate for all purposes, the safer course to pursue would be to phrase the assurance in terms of compliance with the specific sections of the Act whose violation would bar the goods from interstate or foreign commerce.

The language of the statute gives support to this view. It will be noted that the written assurance referred to in section 15(a)(1) is described as one of ''compliance with the requirements of the Act * * *,'' whereas the written assurance referred to in section 12(a) is described as one of ''compliance with this section.'' In view of the differences in wording of the two sections, a court might conclude that a general assurance of compliance with the Act is not sufficient to include a specific assurance of compliance with section 12, on the theory that if Congress had intended an assurance of compliance with the Act to be sufficient under the child-labor provisions, there would have been no reason for the use of the more specific language which it placed

[6] Section 3(i) defines ''goods'' to mean ''goods (including ships and marine equipment), wares, products, commodities, merchandise, or articles or subjects of commerce of any character, or any part or ingredient thereof, but does not include goods after their delivery into the actual physical possession of the ultimate consumer thereof other than a producer, manufacturer, or processor thereof.''

Section 3(j) defines ''produced'' to mean ''produced, manufactured, mined, handled, or in any other manner worked on in any state; and for the purposes of this Act an employee shall be deemed to have been engaged in the production of goods if such employee was employed in producing, manufacturing, mining, handling, transporting, or in any other manner working on such goods, or in any closely related process or occupation directly essential to the production thereof, in any State.''

in section 12. Also, it is possible that a court might conclude that Congress intended, under section 15(a)(1), that the assurance should refer specifically to the particular sections of the Act mentioned therein, since unless there is some violation of one of those sections in the production of goods, a subsequent purchaser is not prohibited from putting them in commerce.

There is no prescribed form or language that must be followed in order for the written assurance of compliance to afford the desired protection. However, in view of the considerations mentioned above, the following is suggested as a guide for the type of language which would appear to provide the maximum degreee of certainty that a purchaser who acquired the goods in good faith in reliance on the written assurance would receive the protection intended by the amendments:

> We hereby certify that these goods were produced in compliance with all applicable requirements of sections 6, 7, and 12 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended, and of regulations and orders of the United States Department of Labor issued under section 14 thereof:

The question has also arisen as to what method should be used to give a purchaser a proper written assurance which would adequately identify the particular goods to which such assurance relates. Although other means of giving proper written assurances may be found to be more practical and convenient, it appears that one simple and feasible method of giving such assurance is for the producer to stamp or print the assurance on the invoice which covers the particular goods and which is given to the purchaser as a part of the transaction whereby the goods are acquired.

### § 789.5 "* * * acquired * * * in good faith * * * for value without notice * * *."

Section 12(a) and section 15(a)(1) of the Act provide that a purchaser must acquire the goods in good faith in reliance on the specified written assurance in order to be accorded the statutory protection.

The legislative history of the amendments indicates that a purchaser's good faith is not to be determined merely from the actual state of his mind but that good faith also depends upon an objective test—that of what a ''reasonable, prudent man, acting with due diligence, would have done in the circumstances.'' This good faith requirement is, in the words of the House Managers, ''comparable to similar requirements imposed on purchasers in other fields of law.'' The final determination of what will amount to good faith can be made only upon the basis of the pertinent facts in each situation.

It is clear, however, that good faith as used in the Act, not only requires honesty of intention but also that a purchaser must not know, have reason to know, or have knowledge of circumstances which ought to put him on inquiry that the goods in question were produced in violation of any of the provisions of the Act referred to in sections 12(a) and 15(a)(1).

These good faith provisions are reinforced by the requirement in sections 12(a) and 15(a)(1) that the purchaser must also acquire his goods ''for value without notice'' of an applicable violation of the Act.

To illustrate the application of the above principles, let us assume that a purchaser of goods for value acquires them in reliance upon a written assurance from the producer, manufacturer, or dealer that the particular goods were produced in compliance with all applicable requirements of the Act, and that the form and content of the assurance is sufficient to meet the conditions of sections 12 and 15(a)(1) of the Act. If a reasonable, prudent man in the purchaser's position, acting with the diligence, would have no reason to question the truth of the assurance that the applicable requirements has been complied with, the purchaser's reliance on such written assurance would be considered to be in good faith and without notice of any violation, and the purchaser would be protected in the event that violations of the child-labor or the wage-hour standards of the Act had actually occurred in the production of such goods by the vendor or by prior producers of the goods. In such circumstances, the purchaser's protection would not be contingent on his securing separate written assurances

from the prior producers or on his assuring himself that his vendor had secured specific guarantees from them with respect to compliance.

# PART 790—GENERAL STATEMENT AS TO THE EFFECT OF THE PORTAL-TO-PORTAL ACT OF 1947 ON THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938

GENERAL

Sec.



PROVISIONS RELATING TO CERTAIN ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN BY EMPLOYEES ON OR AFTER MAY 14, 1947



DEFENSE OF GOOD FAITH RELIANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS, ETC.



RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON EMPLOYEE SUITS



AUTHORITY: 52 Stat. 1060, as amended; 29 U.S.C. 201 *et seq.*

SOURCE: 12 FR 7655, Nov. 18, 1947, unless otherwise noted.

GENERAL

## § 790.1 Introductory statement.

(a) The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 was approved May 4, 1947.[1] It contains provisions which, in certain circumstances, affect the rights and liabilities of employees and employers with regard to alleged underpayments of minimum or overtime wages under the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,[2] the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, and the Bacon-Davis Act. The Portal Act also establishes time limitations for the bringing of certain actions under these three Acts, limits the jurisdiction of the courts with respect to certain claims, and in other respects affects employee suits and proceedings under these Acts.

For the sake of brevity, this Act is referred to in the following discussion as the Portal Act.

(b) It is the purpose of this part to outline and explain the major provisions of the Portal Act as they affect the application to employers and employees of the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The effect of the Portal Act in relation to the Walsh-Healey Act and the Bacon-Davis Act is not within the scope of this part, and is not discussed herein. Many of the provisions of the Portal Act do not apply to claims or liabilities arising out of activities engaged in after the enactment of the Act. These provisions are not discussed at length in this part,[3]

[1] An act to relieve employers from certain liabilities and punishments under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the Walsh-Healey Act, and the Bacon-Davis Act, and for other purposes (61 Stat. 84; 29 U.S.C., Sup., 251 *et seq.*).

[2] 52 Stat. 1060, as amended; 29 U.S.C. 201 *et seq.* In the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Congress exercised its power over interstate commerce to establish basic standards with respect to minimum and overtime wages and to bar from interstate commerce goods in the production of which these standards were not observed. For the nature of liabilities under this Act, see footnote 17.

[3] Sections 790.23 through 790.29 in the prior edition of this part 790 have been omitted in this revision because of their obsolescence in that they dealt with those sections of the Act concerning activities prior to May 14,

*Continued*